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Foreword
I am pleased to contribute a foreword to this report. It highlights an 
important problem which has a significant adverse affect of the quantity 
and quality of healthcare around the world. the authors of the report are 
to be congratulated for their research – over 15 years – into this issue.
the World health organisation (Who) has previously recognised the 
importance of countries improving the efficiency of their healthcare 
systems, thereby releasing resources that could be used to cover more 
people, with more services of high quality. Who cited fraud as one of the 
ten leading causes of inefficiency in healthcare in its 2010 report and it 
is good that this report provides detailed information about its extent. In 
particular, the volume of the healthcare expenditure where losses have 
been measured and the variety of types of expenditure covered make the 
report’s conclusions – that an average of just under 7% of expenditure is 
lost - convincing. 
however, having credible information about the problem of losses to 
healthcare systems is not a goal in itself. the most important reason to 
know about the nature and scale of the problem is because it can help 
countries to apply the right solutions – informing the prioritisation of 
work to counter fraud, the level of investment to be made and where 
best to focus action. underlying research shows that most of these losses 
are high volume, low value – one off, large scale frauds are unusual, but 
widespread low value fraud is common. the good news is that the report 
highlights examples where real gains have been made by reducing the 
cost of fraud – with up to a 40% reduction possible within 12 months and 
significant additional resources freed up for health promotion, disease 
prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and/or palliative care.
fraud in any sector wastes scarce resources, but in respect of healthcare 
it has a direct negative impact on human life – with people waiting 
longer for treatment, people not being able to afford the treatment that 
they need, and some people never receiving the quality of patient care 
that is possible.  It prevents appropriate forms of health promotion and 
prevention that allows people to take control of their own health.
those leading healthcare organisations – in whatever country they 
are – need to read this report and to make sure that their organisations 
are properly protected against fraud. It is not good enough to simply 
hope that fraud doesn’t happen and then to react – after losses have 
been incurred. as with healthcare more generally, pre-emptive action is 
needed to minimise the extent of the problem.
DR DAvID EvANS 
director of health systems financing 
World health organisation
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uk PreFace
I was very pleased to be asked to write the preface to a document which I 
hope will stimulate debate about an issue that is too rarely spoken about 
in the united Kingdom. our colleagues in the usa are many years ahead 
of us in recognising and dealing with healthcare fraud. over there, cases 
are prosecuted by the fBI, and the us government has in place a robust 
legislative framework protecting health funds not only against fraud but 
also against damaging practices that are currently perfectly legal here. 
one topical example of the latter is the payment of incentives to doctors, 
incentives sometimes linked to obligations to use a certain facility or 
based on the value of business generated.  the recent Competition 
Commission investigation of private healthcare showed these to be 
endemic in the uK private sector.
the current healthcare environment is unfortunately one that is 
conducive to fraud. medical services are provided in confidential 
circumstances, they are complex and there is a huge amount of money 
to be made. It is a tribute to the dedicated people who work in our health 
services that the problem is not much worse. 
having said that, there are undoubtedly people whose aim is to steal 
healthcare funds. I know this only too well. I started highlighting concerns 
nearly two decades ago, initially facing scepticism and disbelief from all 
sides – pockets of which still remain. But I also met people who really 
understood the issues and amongst them, I had the pleasure of working 
with Jim Gee, one of the authors of this document who helped our 
organisation set up professional training for our investigators.
DR SImON pECk 
health Insurance Counter fraud Group (hICfG)
as our government increasingly looks to private providers to treat nhs 
patients, I rather fear that some of the fraudulent practices which plague 
the us healthcare system will take root here. It worried me enormously 
when I recently read in the British medical Journal that more than a third 
of members of GP Commissioning Groups have financial interests in 
organisations from which they will be commissioning healthcare, because 
there is a wealth of evidence that such relationships can and do lead 
to abuse. for example, a recent study from the Journal of the american 
medical association recorded that some tests were twelve times as likely 
to be ordered when the doctor ordering them had a financial interest in 
their provision.
I hope this document will be widely read and especially by those who 
have the power to make a difference.  the uK has one of the best health 
systems in the world. But amongst all the providers and users of the 
system, there are a small number who would steal – a truth that needs to 
be faced, however uncomfortable – and it is essential that our funds, both 
private and nhs, are properly protected.  as the authors rightly observe: 
in order to protect against a risk, it is necessary first to understand it 
and to quantify it and I hope that the information in this document will 
encourage readers to do so. 
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south aFrican PreFace
healthcare fraud is an issue for every country. none should pretend that 
they are not affected by the problem, indeed, as with other problems, 
avoiding being in denial about it is the first step to solving it.
the Board of health funders of southern africa (Bhf) and its healthcare 
forensic management unit (hfmu) have made significant progress 
in both raising awareness of and tackling healthcare fraud. despite 
this progress our work still mostly focusses on reacting after fraud has 
taken place and losses have been incurred – in other words viewing 
fraud as a series of individual adverse events to be responded to. this 
report will help us – and colleagues from other countries – to see it as 
it really is – an ever present and ongoing business cost suffered by all 
healthcare organisations of any size, which can be measured, managed 
and minimised. 
the cost of healthcare fraud which is revealed across the world is 
shocking – on average 6.99% of expenditure is lost. In south africa alone 
376 billion rand was spent on healthcare in 2011, the latest year for 
which the World health organisation has figures. the research revealed in 
this report means that, if south africa is in line with the rest of the world 
(and some countries which have been fighting fraud for a lot longer) it 
would mean that over 26 billion rand is lost each year.
LyNETTE SwANEpOEL 
manager, healthcare forensic management unit (hfmu) 
Board of healthcare funders of southern africa
however, the good news is that the report reveals that there are 
examples where organisations from around the world have cut the cost 
of fraud by up to 40% within 12 months. one of the authors, Jim Gee, 
himself lead such work in the uK’s national health service. the key to 
cutting losses appears to be properly protecting healthcare organisations 
against fraud, so that it is pre-empted, rather than simply reacting after 
the event. By doing this more resources can be made available for better 
patient care.
this accords with the findings of ‘the resilience to fraud of medical 
schemes in south africa’ report which Bhf, the hfmu, and university of 
Portsmouth, jointly published with Bdo llP in 2013. as dr humphrey 
Zokufa, Bhf’s managing director, wrote at the time, ‘south africa is not 
immune from this problem. medical schemes recognise that it is a serious 
issue and one that has far reaching consequences including the reduction 
in the availability and quality of patient care.’ this new report highlights 
the need for more action to reduce this significant, avoidable cost.
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TED DOyLE 
accredited health Care fraud Investigator & Certified fraud examiner 
Vice President, healthcare markets, Performant financial Corporation
It is both my honor and pleasure to contribute a Preface to this much 
needed, valued and welcomed report.  I have dedicated my professional 
life of almost 30 years in both the public and private healthcare sectors 
to the detection and prevention of healthcare fraud, waste, abuse and 
improper payments.  this report, its approach to studying and quantifying 
the problem of healthcare fraud and its findings are truly unique and 
like no other report in the healthcare industry today.  I hope that its 
publication will bring much needed continued attention and overall 
awareness to this problem, a problem that is truly of global size, scope 
and impact. 
over the past few years I have been fortunate to know and work with 
one of the authors of this report, Jim Gee, and to have the benefit of the 
previous versions of this report as issued in 2009 and 2011.  I have found 
Jim’s (and of course Professor Button’s) knowledge of this topic and 
insight into the problem of healthcare fraud to be on point and without 
bias as to the causes of the problem. those causes are shared across 
the healthcare system and involve the Providers of service, the Insureds 
(members), the Payors (Insurers) and the regulators of the healthcare 
system and industry.  It is my experience that by working together to 
examine the vulnerabilities that create the opportunities for fraud and 
improper payments to occur, we can successfully identify, investigate 
and stop it from occurring in the future.  But to do that, we must first 
understand the problem, raise awareness and quantify the problem.  This 
report does just that. 
In the united states the annual expenditure on healthcare is 
approximately $3 trillion.  for the “fraudster” (those wishing to do 
financial harm to private and public sector Programs/Plans) this creates 
the financial incentive to find and maximize vulnerabilities.  the us 
has made great progress in recent years in addressing the problem of 
healthcare fraud.  for example, in a recent study it was reported that the 
“u.s. recovers $16 for every $1 it spends fighting civil healthcare fraud” 
and further that “combined civil, criminal and state recoveries from 2008 
us PreFace
through 2012 total approximately $18.3 billion.”  additionally, federal 
prosecutions are up 9.9% from 343 in fiscal year 2003 to 377 in 2013, 
and us federal law enforcement reports that $4.3 billion was recovered in 
2013 through healthcare fraud enforcement. this is wonderful progress! 
however, if we consider again the total annual expenditure of $3 trillion 
and either a conservative estimate of 3% or an average fraud loss rate 
of 6.99% that equates to annual fraud losses equivalent to a range of 
$90 billion to $210 billion.  Clearly, more has to be done, and no matter 
how effective law enforcement is, they cannot do it alone. 
for the solution to be truly effective we need the shared actions of 
the aforementioned Providers, members, Insurers, regulators and also 
the “Global health Care anti-fraud network” (industry anti-fraud 
associations: nhCaa, ChCaa, ehfCn, hICfG and hfmu) working 
together to increase awareness and develop strategies to identify and 
stop improper claims before they’re paid.  healthcare Insurers and 
Payment Integrity companies responsible for developing advanced 
analytics, predictive modeling, social analytics, etc., can and are leading 
the way to help identify, investigate and stop these improper payments.  
through the proactive application of these tools these entities are helping 
to reduce improper payments and thereby freeing up vital funding 
for better patient care that meets today’s ever changing and evolving 
healthcare needs.
I applaud the work of Jim Gee, Professor mark Button and thank them 
and their respective teams for this report and for continuing to raise 
awareness for this most important and globally impactful problem.  
through their work and that of the key stakeholders mentioned herein, 
we can significantly reduce the losses related to healthcare fraud.  thank 
you for allowing me the opportunity to share my thoughts. 
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1 introduction
1.1 this report renews research first undertaken in 2009 and repeated 
in 2011, collating the latest, accurate, statistically valid information 
from around the world about the real financial cost of healthcare 
fraud and error. 
1.2 the measurement of losses to fraud (and error) is an essential first 
step to successful action. once the extent of fraud losses is known 
then they can be treated like any other business cost – something to 
be reduced and minimised in the best interest of the financial health 
and stability of the organisation concerned. It becomes possible to 
go beyond reacting to unforeseen individual instances of fraud and 
to include plans to pre-empt and minimise fraud losses in business 
plans.
1.3 the report doesn’t just look at detected fraud or the individual 
cases which have come to light and been prosecuted. Because 
there is no crime which has a 100% detection rate, adding together 
detected fraud significantly underestimates the problem. It is also 
the case that if detected fraud losses go up, does that mean that 
there is more fraud or that there has been better detection; equally, 
if detected fraud losses fall, does that mean that there is less fraud 
or worse detection?
1.4 the report also doesn’t rely on survey-based information where 
those involved are asked for their opinions about the level of 
fraud. these tend to vary significantly according to the perceived 
seriousness of the problem at the time by those surveyed. While 
they sometimes represent a valid survey of opinion, that is very 
different from a valid survey of losses.
1.5 the financial and economic damage resulting from healthcare fraud 
(and error) is surely the worst aspect of the problem. Yes, fraud 
is unethical, immoral and unlawful; yes, the individuals who are 
proven to have been involved should be punished; yes, the sums 
lost to fraud need to be traced and recovered. however, these are 
actions which take place after the fraud losses have happened 
– after the resources have been diverted from where they were 
intended and after the damage to the quality of patient care has 
occurred. 
1.6 In almost every other area, healthcare organisations know what 
their costs are – staffing costs, accommodation costs, utility costs, 
procurement costs and many others. for centuries, these costs have 
been assessed and reviewed and measures have been developed to 
pre-empt them and improve efficiency. this incremental process 
now often delivers quite small additional improvements.
1.7 fraud and error costs, on the other hand, have only very rarely had 
the same focus. the common position has been that organisations 
have either denied that they had any fraud or planned only to react 
after fraud has taken place. Because of this, fraud is now one of the 
great unreduced healthcare costs.
1.8 however, a cost can only be reduced if it can be measured, and a 
methodology to do this accurately has only been developed and 
implemented over the last decade.
1.9 now that we can measure fraud and error losses, we can make 
proper judgements about the level of investment to be made in 
reducing them. now that we can measure these losses, we can also 
measure the financial benefits resulting from their reduction.
1.10 In the current macro-economic climate, reducing these losses is one 
of the least painful ways of reducing costs. this report identifies 
what the financial cost of healthcare fraud and error has been found 
to be and thus, the ‘size of the prize’ to be achieved from reducing 
it.
1.11 of course, there is always more research to be done and any 
organisation should consider what its own fraud and error costs are 
likely to be, however, the volume of data which is already available 
from exercises now covering close to £2 trillion, points clearly to 
losses usually being found in the range of 3-8%.
1.12 We will continue to monitor data as it becomes available and 
publish further reports as appropriate.
jIm gEE 
director of Counter fraud services, Bdo llP 
and Visiting Professor and Chair of the Centre for Counter fraud studies
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2 overview
2.1 the original ‘financial Cost of healthcare fraud report’, published 
in 2009 identified and reviewed 69 exercises (of which 66 were 
successfully completed) to accurately measure healthcare fraud and 
error losses, undertaken across the world between 1997 and 2007. 
2.2 the 2011 report took account of a exercises undertaken during 
2008 and 2009, and this 2013 report considers further exercises 
which took place during 2010 and 2011 and reports on a total of 
92 exercises. the growth in the number of organisations which are 
accurately measuring the cost of fraud is marked.
2.3 as a result of the rapid increase in prevalence of this work the 
totality of the research published in this report now covers 14 
different types of healthcare expenditure totalling over £1.93 trillion 
($2.99 trillion), in 33 organisations from 7 countries. the value of 
the expenditure examined has not been uprated to 2013 values. the 
losses referred to are a percentage loss of expenditure.
2.4 this report is based on extensive global research, building on 
previously established direct knowledge, to collate information 
about relevant exercises. the data was then analysed electronically. 
exercises were collated from europe, north america and australia 
and new Zealand. none were found in asia or africa, although 
the authors are aware of developments which should lead to this 
happening in the near future.
2.5 the report has excluded guesstimates, figures derived from 
detected fraud losses, and figures resulting from surveys of opinion. 
It has also excluded some loss measurement exercises where it is 
clear that they have not met the standards described below.
2.6 It has included exercises which
•	 have considered a statistically valid sample of income or 
expenditure
•	 which have sought and examined information indicating the 
presence of fraud, error or correctness in each case within that 
sample
•	 which have been completed and reported
•	 which have been externally validated
•	 which have a measurable level of statistical confidence; 
and
•	 which have a measurable level of accuracy.
2.7  there are a number of caveats.
•	 some of the exercises have resulted in estimates of the fraud 
frequency rate, some of the percentage of expenditure lost to 
fraud, and some have measured both;
•	 It is also the case that some exercises have separately identified 
measured fraud and error and some have not;
•	 sometimes, once such exercises have been completed, the 
organisations concerned have, mistakenly in the view of the 
author of this report, decided not to publish their results. 
transparency about the scale of the problem is a key factor in its 
solution, because attention can be focussed and a proportionate 
investment made;
•	 In some cases, those directly involved in countering fraud 
have decided, confidentially, to provide information about 
unpublished exercises for wider consideration. In those cases, 
while the overall figures have been included in the findings 
of this report, no specific reference has been made to the 
organisations concerned;
•	 the authors of this report are also aware of a very small number 
of other exercises which have been completed, but which have 
not been published and where nothing is known of the findings; 
and 
•	 finally, it is important to emphasise that this research will never 
be complete. more evidence becomes available each year. 
however, the preponderance of the evidence does point clearly 
in one direction, as is explained later.
2.8 While it is necessary to make these caveats clear, the importance of 
the evidence collated in this report should not be underestimated. 
It shows that losses to fraud and error in the healthcare sector 
represent a significant, damaging and, crucially, unnecessary 
business cost.
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3.1 the six countries in which the authors are aware that healthcare 
loss analysis exercises have taken place are:
•	 the uK;





3.2 By value of income or expenditure measured, the united states has 
undertaken the greatest amount of work in this area. this is a direct 
reflection of the Improper Payments Information act of 2002 (IPIa) 
(now followed my the more recent Improper Payments elimination 
and recovery act of 2010) which requires designated major u.s. 
public authorities to estimate the annual amount of payments 
made where fraud and error are present, and to report the estimates 
to the President and Congress with a progress report on actions to 
reduce them. 
3.3 the guidance relating to the IPIa stated “the estimates shall be 
based on the equivalent of a statistical random sample with a 
precision requiring a sample of sufficient size to yield an estimate 
with a 90% confidence interval of plus or minus 2.5%” . many u.s. 
agencies undertake work to the higher standard often found in the 
u.K. and europe – 95% statistical confidence and + or - 1%.
3.4 In other countries, while there has not hitherto been any legal 
requirement, there is a growing understanding that the key to 
successful loss reduction is to understand the nature and scale of 
the problem. for example, in europe, the european healthcare 
fraud and Corruption declaration of 2004, agreed by organisations 
from 28 countries called for “the development of a european 
common standard of risk measurement, with annual statistically 
valid follow up exercises to measure progress in reducing losses to 
fraud and corruption throughout the eu.” 
the nature oF the data  
which has been analysed3
3.5 the range of types of income and expenditure, where losses have 
been measured, include fraud (and error) involving patients, 
healthcare professionals, staff and managers, and contractors.
3.6 the specific areas where losses have been measured include:
•	 the fraudulent provision of sickness certificates
•	 prescription fraud by pharmacists
•	 prescription fraud by patients
•	 fraud and error concerning capitation payments to general 
practitioners
•	 fraud and error concerning payments made to doctors to 
manage a patients medical care
•	 the evasion of dental charges by patients
•	 fraud and error by opticians concerning the provision of sight 
tests
•	 fraud and error concerning employees of healthcare 
organisations
•	 fraud and error concerning payments for in-patient hospital 
services
•	 fraud and error concerning long term care
•	 fraud and error concerning home and community based services
•	 fraud and error concerning the provision of services and supplies, 
•	 fraud and error concerning health insurance for children
•	 fraud and error concerning foster care
•	 fraud and error concerning child care.
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4.1 the range of percentage losses across all the exercises reviewed 
between 1997 and 2011 was found to be between 0.6% and 15.4% 
with average losses of 6.99% (almost 97% of the exercises showed 
losses figures of more than 3%).
4.3 It is clear that fraud remains a significant problem and one which 
involves a larger cost than previously thought. Where organisations 
have undertaken repeated exercises to measure their losses in the 
same areas of expenditure, then the evidence also shows that this 
has helped to reduce them. 
4.4 the current global average loss rate of 6.99% - a running average 
taking account of 15 years of data - when taken as a proportion of 
global healthcare expenditure for 2011 ($6.97 trillion, £4.48 trillion 
or €5.38 trillion), equates to $487 billion, £313 billion or €376 
billion. 
4.5 this sum  equates to 
•	 three times the nhs’s total expenditure for 2011-2012;
•	 two and a half times the total healthcare expenditure of Canada 
for 2011;
•	 fourteen times the total healthcare expenditure of south africa 
for 2011;
4.6 It would fund almost a fifth of the united states total healthcare 
expenditure for 2011 and more than 27% of european union 
countries total healthcare expenditure for the same period.
4.7 this is an enormous sum which is diverted from the provision of 
patient care.
4.8 even reducing such losses by 40%, which individual organisations 
have achieved, would free up more than $195 billion, £125 billion or 
€150 billion.
4.9 on the basis of the evidence, it is clear that fraud and error losses 
in any organisation should currently be expected to be at least 3%, 
probably more than 5% and possibly more than 10% . It would 
be wrong to go too much further in terms of predicting where in 
this range, losses for an individual organisation, will be, without 
some organisation-specific information about the strength of 
arrangements to protect it against fraud (its ‘fraud resilience’).
4.10 Bdo llP and the CCfs, in parallel research, have developed 
europe’s most comprehensive database of fraud resilience 
information, with data recorded concerning over 700 organisations. 
By combining the data which underpins this report and 
organisation-specific information about fraud resilience, we are 
able, for the first time, to 
•	 predict the likely scale of losses;
•	 the key improvements which would reduce them; and 
•	 the related cost.
4.11 We can also accurately measure losses or train client organisations 
to do this. the practical experience of Bdo llP specialists 
combined with the academic rigour of CCfs researchers provides an 
unparalleled expert resource.
4.2 this 2013 research also includes data from 2010 and 2011. exercises 
across the period between 1998 and 2011 show average losses 
of 6.99%. this figure remains 25% higher than the pre-recession 
average of 5.59%.
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conclusion5
5.1 this report renews research into accurate information concerning 
the extent of losses to healthcare fraud and error. Without such 
information it is impossible for healthcare organisations to properly 
prioritise the problem or to invest proportionate sums in solving it. 
5.2 the research demonstrates conclusively that it is possible to 
measure the nature and extent of healthcare losses. It may be 
embarrassing for some organisations to find out just how much 
they are losing but it is possible to do this. 
5.3 Because of the direct, negative impact on human life of healthcare 
losses, it is never easy to admit they take place.  however, the first 
step to reducing losses is to stop being in denial about them. If an 
organisation is not aware of the extent or nature of its losses, how 
can it apply the right solution and reduce them?
5.4 Where losses have been measured, and the organisations concerned 
have accurate information about their nature and extent, there 
are examples where losses have been substantially reduced. these 
include the uK’s national health service (the second largest 
organisation in the world) between 1999 and 2006 where losses 
were reduced by up to 60%, and by up to 40% over a shorter 
period .
5.5 three things are clear:
•	 losses to healthcare fraud and error can be measured – and cost 
effectively;
•	 on the basis of the evidence it is likely that losses in any 
healthcare organisation and any area of expenditure will be at 
least 3%, probably more than 7% and possibly over 10%; and
•	 with the benefit of accurate information about their nature and 
extent, they can be reduced significantly. 
5.6 Countering fraud effectively would reduce these losses and free up 
massive resources for better patient care. the authors of this report 
hope that it focuses attention on this problem and the potential 
benefits to be derived from starting to solve it.
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focus for research, knowledge transfer and educational provision to the 
counter fraud community. 
the Centre for Counter fraud studies makes its independent research 
findings available to support those working in counter fraud by providing 
the latest and best information on the effectiveness of counter fraud 
strategies.
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